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Abstract: This article discusses the works of the first two lecturers on natural law in 
Copenhagen, Henrik Weghorst and Christian Reitzer. Contrary to the existing scholarship 
which characterises their works as derivative of either Grotius or Pufendorf, the article argues
that the character and significance of these works can only be grasped when understood in 
light of the local intellectual traditions on which they built. Seen against this background, it 
becomes clear that Weghorst and Reitzer developed significantly different theories of natural 
law, disagreeing on such fundamental issues as the definition of law, the moral good, and the 
role of sociality in natural law. Following a tradition of Christian natural law in Kiel, 
Weghorst developed a theory of natural law fundamentally critical of the secularising theories
of Grotius and Pufendorf, while Reitzer followed Pufendorf and his disciple Christian 
Thomasius in Halle. The article concludes by indicating how Weghorst's and Reitzer's works 
established the framework for discussions of natural law in the first decades of the eighteenth 
century, suggesting the need for further research into the significance of natural law for the 
early enlightenment in Denmark-Norway.
Keywords: Natural law; enlightenment; Samuel Pufendorf; Hugo Grotius; Denmark-Norway.
This is an uncorrected, pre-proof version. Please do not cite.
Published in History of European Ideas, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01916599.2016.1182045
1. Introduction
The official political ideology in the Danish-Norwegian dual kingdom until the early eighteenth 
century is widely considered to have been a strongly theological divine right theory. It would, 
therefore, seem of great interest to know the circumstances and content of the first teaching of 
natural law in Copenhagen. This occurred during the years following a violent polemic between 
Christian Thomasius, the Leipzig jurisconsult and natural lawyer, and Hector Gottfried Masius, the 
court preacher to the Danish King Christian V, which culminated in Thomasius's writings being 
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burned on the public square in Copenhagen by the executioner and contributed to his banishment 
from Leipzig to Halle.1 Nevertheless, the natural law theories of the first Danish teachers of the 
subject, Henrik Weghorst and Christian Reitzer, have not been the subject of detailed historical 
analysis. By offering such a study, this article aims to contribute to the scholarship on the history of
post-Grotian natural law theorising in general and to the intellectual and political history of early 
enlightenment Denmark-Norway in particular.
2. Henrik Weghorst and Christian Reitzer in the historiography
Natural law as a prominent political discourse in the centuries following the publication of Hugo 
Grotius's De iure belli ac pacis in 1625 has received increasing scholarly attention in recent 
decades. The significance of natural law for the history of a wide range of disciplines, including 
moral and political philosophy, law, economics and theology, and a range of issues, including the 
development of the absolutist state, the relationship between church and state, theories of rights, 
secularisation and toleration in various forms of enlightenment, and in particular the distinctive 
contributions of Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius to so-called 
‘voluntarist’ natural law have been investigated in detail.2
1 For detailed discussions of the polemics between Masius and Thomasius from a variety of 
perspectives, see Frank Grunert, ‘Zur aufgeklärten Kritik am theokratischen Absolutismus. Der Streit 
zwischen Hector Gottfried Masius und Christian Thomasius über Ursprung und Begründung der 
summa potestas’, in Christian Thomasius (1655-1728). Neue Forschungen im Kontext der 
Frühaufklärung, ed. Friedrich Vollhardt (Tübingen, 1997), 51–77; Frank Grunert, ‘»Händel mit Herrn 
Hector Gottfried Masio«. Zur Pragmatik des Streits in den Kontroversen mit dem Kopenhagener 
Hofprediger’, in Appell an das Publikum: Die öffentliche Debatte in der deutschen Aufklärung 1687-
1796, ed. Ursula Goldenbaum (Berlin, 2004), 119–74; Frank Grunert, ‘Konfessionelle Konkurrenz und
politisches Kalkül. Der dänische Hofprediger Hector Gottfried Masius’, in Religion Macht Politik: 
Hofgeistlichkeit im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Matthias Meinhardt et al. (Wiesbaden, 2014), 323–
40.
2 See e.g. Thomas Ahnert, Religion and the Origins of the German Enlightenment: Faith and the 
Reform of Learning in the Thought of Christian Thomasius (Rochester, 2006); Annabel S. Brett, 
Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law (Princeton, 2011); 
Frank Grunert, Normbegründung und politische Legitimität: zur Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie der 
deutschen Frühaufklärung (Tübingen, 2000); Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: 
From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1996); Knud Haakonssen, ‘German Natural 
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In line with this, scholars have emphasised the need for studies of how their thought was 
received, adapted, used and transformed in different places by their students.3 Thus it has been 
highlighted that so-called minor or second generation teachers of natural law often were even more
influential than the canonical thinkers in shaping how natural law was taught and implemented in 
political reforms.4 This raises the further question of the existence of local ‘dialects’ of the 
discourse of natural law, and how such local ‘dialects’ were adapted to local concerns.
While there have been detailed studies of the reception and influence of post-Grotian 
natural law in Sweden, there are, however, no comparable studies of its reception in the other 
Scandinavian state, the double monarchy of Denmark-Norway.5 Despite the fact that central figures
in early enlightenment Denmark-Norway, including Christian Reitzer, Ludvig Holberg and 
Andreas Hojer, are conventionally characterised as being influenced by Pufendorf and Thomasius 
the reception of the Pufendorfian-Thomasian natural law in Denmark-Norway has not been the 
subject of detailed historical enquiry, and neither has its place in early enlightenment thought.6
Law’, in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, ed. Mark Goldie and Robert
Wokler (Cambridge, 2006), 249–90; Tim J. Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early 
Enlightenment (Cambridge, 2000); Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments Civil and Metaphysical 
Philosophy in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge, 2001); Ian Hunter, The Secularisation of the 
Confessional State: The Political Thought of Christian Thomasius (Cambridge, 2007); Richard Tuck, 
Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651 (Cambridge, 1993); Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and 
Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford, 1999).
3 The significance of Thomasius for the universities in Halle and Göttingen has been studied in detail in 
Notker Hammerstein, Ius und Historie: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des historischen Denkens an 
deutschen Universitaten im spaten 17. und im 18. Jahrhundert (Gottingen, 1972).
4 Dominik Recknagel, ‘Naturrecht in der Lehre. Naturrechtliche Vorlesungen an der Friedrichs-
Universität zu Halle bis zum Jahr 1850’, in ,,Vernunft, du weiß allein, was meine Pflichten sind!’’ 
Naturrechtslehre in Halle, ed. Dominik Recknagel and Sabine Wöller (Halle (Saale), 2013), 12.
5 Bo Lindberg, Naturrätten i Uppsala 1655-1720 (Uppsala, 1976); Per Nilsén, Att ‘stoppa munnen till 
på bespottare’: den akademiska undervisningen i svensk statsrätt under frihetstiden (Lund, 2001). For 
the reception of Christian Thomasius in the Baltic, see Hanspeter Marti, ‘Christian Thomasius und der 
Pietismus im Spiegel ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte. Zur philosophiegeschichtlichen Bedeutung der 
Thomasius-Rezeption im Baltikum’, in Christian Thomasius (1655-1728). Neue Forschungen im 
Kontext der Frühaufklärung, ed. Friedrich Vollhardt (Tübingen, 1997), 235–50.
6 For important suggestions in this direction, however, see Kasper Risbjerg Eskildsen, ‘Print, Fashion, 
and the Making of the Enlightenment Philosopher’, in Northern Antiquities and National Identities. 
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Henrik Weghorst and Christian Reitzer are usually discussed together in the scholarship as 
the two responsible for introducing modern, that is, post-Grotian, natural law. Like many other 
authors from the time, however, they are primarily set as background to the pre-eminent figure in 
the Danish-Norwegian enlightenment, Ludvig Holberg. Accordingly the content of their natural 
law works is rarely discussed, with scholars contending themselves with characterising them as 
following one or other of the ‘great thinkers’. Edvard Holm, in what is still considered his classical 
study of Ludvig Holberg's political views, characterises both thinkers as following Pufendorf.7 
Kåre Foss's study of Ludvig Holberg's theory of natural natural law against, as the title says, ‘its 
intellectual background’, likewise characterises all Danish natural law before Holberg, that is 
Weghorst and Reitzer, as ‘diluted Pufendorf’.8 The most recent account of the history of law at 
Copenhagen University introduces a slight variation, characterising Reitzer as following Grotius 
and Pufendorf while claiming that Weghorst's work on natural law was ‘entirely orientated towards
Grotius.’9
From surveying the scholarship, then, one gets the sense that both Weghorst and Reitzer 
offered more or less the same thing: the first brief – and Latin – introductions to natural law on the 
Perceptions of Denmark and the North in the Eighteenth Century. Symposium held in Copenhagen 
August 2005, ed. Knud Haakonssen and Henrik Horstbøl (København, 2008), 126–44; Knud 
Haakonssen, ‘Holbergs Pufendorf – men hvilken Pufendorf?’, in Ludvig Holbergs naturret, ed. Jørgen 
Sejersted and Eiliv Vinje (Oslo, 2012), 31–45; Sebastian Olden-Jørgensen, ‘“Saa at jeg har efterlevet 
en Historieskrivers uden at overtræde en Borgers Pligt” - naturret og historie i Holbergs behandling af 
enevældens indførelse 1660’, in Ludvig Holbergs naturret, ed. Jørgen Sejersted and Eiliv Vinje (Oslo, 
2012), 118–39; Sebastian Olden-Jørgensen, ‘Scandinavia’, in European Political Thought, 1450-1700:
Religion, Law and Philosophy, ed. Howell A. Lloyd, Glenn Burgess, and Simon Hodson (New Haven, 
2007), 300-331. The standard account of enlightenment philosophy in Denmark is given as a history of
of the eclipse of a conservative, Aristotelian philosophy by Wolffianism followed by French and 
British influences as well as Kantianism. Carl Henrik Koch, Dansk oplysningsfilosofi, 1700-1800 
(København, 2003). But see also Koch, ‘Dänemark und Norwegen’, in Die Philosophie des 18. 
Jahrhunderts, ed. Helmut Holzhey and Vilem Mudroch, vol. 5: Heiliges Römisches Reich Deutscher 
Nation, Schweiz, Nord- und Osteuropa, Zweiter Halbband (Basel, 2014), 1509-11,which briefly 
mentions Thomasius's influence as well.
7 Edvard Holm, Holbergs statsretslige og politiske synsmåde (Kjøbenhavn, 1879), 17, 18n1.
8 Kåre Foss, Ludvig Holbergs naturrett på idéhistorisk bakgrunn (Oslo, 1934), 175.
9 Ditlev Tamm, Juraen på Københavns Universitet 1479-2005 (København, 2005), 65.
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basis of Grotius and Pufendorf, soon to be superseded by Ludvig Holberg's great Danish 
introduction to natural law on the basis of Grotius, Pufendorf and Thomasius. However, Grotius’ 
and Pufendorf's theories of natural law were by no means identical or indeed necessarily 
compatible, and so, how the two were combined would prove a decisive difference. Moreover, 
‘following’ or ‘being orientated towards’ Grotius or Pufendorf, or a combination of the two, would 
always involve an act of interpretation, adaptation and use, which would influence the ‘Grotian’ 
and ‘Pufendorfian’ natural law thus developed. It will be shown that Weghorst and Reitzer in fact 
developed two fundamentally different positions on natural law reflecting the different local 
academic contexts and discourses in which they were educated, Kiel and Halle.
3. The institutional context of natural law in Denmark-Norway
Although the absolutist constitution of Denmark-Norway, the Lex Regia, of 1665 was significantly 
influenced by the contractual framework of Grotian natural law, the constitution was kept secret 
and only published in 1709. The official ideology was one of divine right absolutism, as 
represented e.g. by the bishop Hans Wandal and the court preacher Hector Gottfried Masius.10 
While Masius's intentions with Interesse principum circa religionem Evangelicam (The Advantage
of the Evangelical Religion to the Princes), the work which sparked off the polemics with 
Thomasius, were primarily confessional, it included arguments highly critical of ‘secular’ natural 
law. Worried by the prospects of increased Calvinist immigration following the revocation of the 
edict of Nantes, he warned against the subversive nature of Calvinist religious doctrine, advising 
the King that his best interest lay in maintaining the purity of Lutheran doctrine among his 
subjects.11 As part of his argument that political order could only be maintained on the grounds of 
the true Lutheran religion, Masius had explicitly denied the validity of a natural law on the basis of 
reason. Divorced from revealed religion, natural law was a ‘maimed and mutilated doctrine’. The 
duties towards God were taught exclusively by religion, while those towards oneself and others 
were determined partly by right reason and partly by religion. As such revealed religion should 
take ‘first place’ in any doctrine of natural law.12
10 For an account of political thought and ideology in Denmark-Norway and Sweden, see Olden-
Jørgensen, ‘Scandinavia’, for the Lex Regia, Wandal and Masius, see pp. 322–6.
11 For an analysis of Masius's confessional agenda, see in particular Grunert, ‘Konfessionelle Konkurrenz
und politisches Kalkül’.
12 Hector Gottfried Masius, Interesse principum circa religionem Evangelicam ad serenissimum ac 
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Despite Masius highly critical remarks concerning the discipline of natural law in a work 
that received official support, steps were being taken to introduce precisely this academic subject in
the University of Copenhagen, seemingly as part of a general endeavour to raise the quality of 
education in the capital. A draft of new university statutes from 1691 stipulated that the professor 
of law ‘should explain Jus Naturae and Gentium’.13 Although teaching of natural law was first 
codified in the new statutes for the University of Copenhagen in 1732, with a chair in ‘Jus Naturae 
et Gentium as well as Jus Publicum’ and moral philosophy,14 natural law was taught in the 1690s at
the modern (albeit short-lived) Knights' Academy in Copenhagen and probably at the University as
well.
The Knights' Academy in Copenhagen was founded in 1691, on the model of the knights' 
academies in the German lands.15 It seems Christian Reitzer had been first choice as professor of 
law, but (probably because of his appointment at the university) Weghorst was appointed in the 
spring of 1692 instead.16 In a report of his teaching from October 1693 Weghorst declares his 
intention to turn to the law of nature and nations.17 The following year Weghorst had completed a 
manuscript textbook on natural law, the Compendium Juris naturæ (Compendium on natural law), 
potentissimum Daniæ Regem (Hafniae, 1687), 3f.
13 1691 draft of new university statutes printed in William Norvin, Københavns Universitet i 
Reformationens og Orthodoxiens Tidsalder, vol. 2 (København, 1940), 86. 
14 1732 university statutes printed in Ibid., 2:114. On the statutes, see Tamm, Juraen på Københavns 
Universitet, 70ff.
15 For a general account of the history of the Knights' Academy and the sources pertaining to it, see 
William Norvin, ‘Det ridderlige Akademi i København’, in Historiske Meddelelser om København, 
vol. 2. rk. 5. bd. (København, 1931), 103–235; William Norvin, ‘Aktsstykker til Oplysning om det 
ridderlige Akademi i København 1690–1710’, in Danske Magazin, 6. rk. 5. bd. (København, 1930), 1–
169.
16 Norvin, ‘Det ridderlige Akademi i København’, 206; Norvin, ‘Aktstykker’, 19, 134
17 Norvin, ‘Aktstykker’, 68. For biographical information, see ‘Heinrich Weghorst’, Dansk Biografisk 
Leksikon Online, accessed 2 February 2016, 
http://denstoredanske.dk/Dansk_Biografisk_Leksikon/Samfund,_jura_og_politik/Jura/Jurist/
Heinrich_Weghorst; Johann Moller, Cimbria literata (Hafniae, 1744), I:715; Johann Heinrich Zedler, 
Grosses vollständiges Universal Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste, 1731, 53:1917f.; Tamm, 
Juraen på Københavns Universitet, 65.
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which likely formed the basis of his lectures on the subject.18 The first three parts of the collegium 
provided the material for a dissertation presided over by Weghorst on 19th March 1696, the 
Compendii juris naturæ, Dissertatio prima (Compendium on natural law, first dissertation).19 In 
1693 Weghorst had been appointed professor designatus in the Faculty of Philosophy at the 
University, where he became ordinary professor sometime between 1698 and 1700. In 1704 a 
personal chair in ‘Juris & moralis scientiae’ was created for Weghorst, a post which he held to his 
death in 1722.20
Having been professor designatus in both philosophy and law since 1689, and having 
studied in Halle in 1690-2, Christian Reitzer returned to take up the chair as professor of law at 
Copenhagen University in 1692 (the only chair in law until 1732), a post he held until 1723.21 
According to the official catalogue of public lectures at the university, Reitzer taught natural law in
1700-01.22 Although there is a gap in the catalogue for the years between 1686 and 1698, there is 
some evidence that Reitzer taught natural law earlier in the 1690s as well. In 1694 Reitzer 
published the short (and incomplete) Positiones ex jure divino, sive universali, sub præsidio 
Christiani Reitzer defendent juvenes (Subjects from divine or universal law, which some most 
noble and learned youths will defend, presided over by Christian Reitzer), which, considering the 
title, is likely to have grown out of his teaching.23 The topic of universal divine law proved a 
continuing topic in Reitzer's teaching, and in 1702 he published a revised and much longer version 
of the work, (although also incomplete) Positionum ex jure divino universali partis primæ caput 
primum (Subjects from divine universal law, part one chapter one), which was explicitly conceived
18 The manuscript collegium bears the inscription ‘haec scripseram A. 1694’ Henrik Weghorst, 
‘Compendium Juris naturæ’ (Thott 909 4o, 1694), final page.
19 Henrik Weghorst, Compendii juris naturæ, Dissertatio prima (Hafniae, 1696).
20 Ejvind Slottved, Lærestole og lærere ved Københavns Universitet 1537-1977 (København, 1978), 90, 
139, 213.
21 Ibid., 88, 213. For biographical information, see ‘Christian Reitzer’, Dansk Biografisk Leksikon 
Online, accessed 2 February 2016, 
http://denstoredanske.dk/Dansk_Biografisk_Leksikon/Kunst_og_kultur/Litteratur/Bogsamler/
Christian_Reitzer.
22 Lectiones publicae Professorum in Universitate Hauniensi (Hafniae, n.d.), 1700–01.
23 Christian Reitzer, Positiones ex jure divino, sive universali, sub præsidio Christiani Reitzer defendent 
juvenes (Hafniae, 1694).
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as an aid to students studying natural law.24 In addition, Reitzer had published the dissertation De 
obligatione sontium ad subeundam poenam dissertatio (On the obligation of the guilty to submit to
punishment) in 1793, in part a criticism of Hobbes's position on the subject on the basis of 
Pufendorfian natural law.25
Weghorst's and Reitzer's careers, then, were parallel: they were both appointed professors 
of law in the early 1690s and both devoted significant parts of their academic endeavours to 
teaching the new post-Grotian natural law, Weghorst at the academy and the university in the 
faculty of philosophy, and Reitzer in the faculty of law. It is therefore not surprising that they have 
been mentioned together in the existing historiography touching on natural law in Denmark-
Norway, and perhaps this parallel in their academic careers has led scholars to see parallels also in 
the substance of their teaching. However, as we shall see in the following, Weghorst and Reitzer 
developed decidedly different theories of natural law.
4. Pufendorfian natural law: Christian Reitzer's Positionum ex iure divino universali
Christian Reitzer's works on natural law reflect the fact that he had studied in Halle in 1690-2 
under Christian Thomasius. In 1688, Thomasius had published his Institutes of Divine 
Jurisprudence, which was largely a defence and elaboration of Pufendorf's theory of natural law.26 
Thomasius lectured on his Institutes in 1691 (in private collegium) and it is likely that Reitzer 
attended at least some of these, and perhaps even discussed issues of natural law with Thomasius 
himself.27 In the invitation to this collegium, which was published as an introduction to later 
editions of the Institutiones, Thomasius gave a brief account of the history and present state of the 
discipline of natural law, highlighting the contributions in particular of Grotius and Pufendorf and 
explaining how his own Institutes were intended as a defence of Pufendorf against the Leipzig 
theologian Valentin Alberti. The introduction to the collegium is interesting for our purposes as it 
provides a succinct summary of the perspective on natural law which Reitzer would take with him 
24 Christian Reitzer, Positionum ex jure divino universali partis primæ caput primum, seu de iis, quæ 
universo in iure præcognita esse debent (Hafniae, 1702).
25 Christian Reitzer, De obligatione sontium ad subeundam poenam dissertatio (Hafniae, 1693).
26 Christian Thomasius, Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence: With Selections from Foundations of the Law
of Nature and Nations, ed. Thomas Ahnert (Indianapolis, 2011), ‘Introductory dissertation’, 13ff. 
27 Decades later Thomasius would recall Reitzer's stay in Halle in conversation with a travelling Danish 
student; cf. Vello Helk, Dansk-norske studierejser, 1661-1813, vol. 1 (Odense, 1991), 91.
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from Halle to Copenhagen as well as the issues at stake between him and Weghorst.
Thomasius presented the recent advances in the discipline of natural law as part of a general
progress of learning in the Protestant universities during the second half of the seventeenth century,
abolishing the ‘servitude’ that had characterised previous centuries. Although the ‘scholastics 
among the papists’ had written numerous works on natural law they had completely confused 
Scripture, nature, and human laws in a way more likely to confuse ‘a reasonable human being’ than
anything else. What was more, this form of scholastic natural law had been appropriated by the 
Protestants, as evidenced by the works of the Tübingen theologian Johann Adam Osiander.28
According to Thomasius, it was Hugo Grotius who first had begun to rescue the ‘noble 
discipline’ of natural law and clean the ‘dust of the schools’ from it and thus given the discipline a 
high standing.29 His books had been very well received in the universities (though obscured by 
commentaries), but this, Thomasius argued, was only because Grotius was the first to ‘break the 
ground’, for, being first, his breach with tradition was insufficient. Although Grotius sought the law
of nature in human nature, he retained many scholastic errors in his ‘definition of the law of 
nature’. These included the doctrines that things prohibited by the law of nature ‘were morally bad 
in themselves and prior to divine will’ and the ‘etiamsi daremus’ principle that natural law would 
obligate even if God did not exist.30
That Thomasius was right about the reasons for the good reception of Grotius was brought 
out by the violent abuse and polemics that met Pufendorf when he had attacked these scholastic 
remnants in his 1672 De iure naturae et gentium libri octo (On the Law of Nature and Nations).31 It
28 Christian Thomasius, ‘Christian Thomas [...] Eröffnet Der Studierenden Jugend in Halle Ein 
Collegium Privatum Uber seine Institutiones Jurisprudentiae Divinae’, in Institutionum Jurisprudentiæ
Divinæ Libri Tres (Halæ, 1710), 74f. For an account of Osiander's ‘Christian natural law’, see Hans-
Peter Schneider, Justitia universalis: Quellenstudien zur Geschichte des ‘Christlichen Naturrechts’ bei
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Frankfurt am Main, 1967), 151–9.
29 Thomasius, ‘Collegium privatum’, 76.
30 ‘wie er denn auch in Definition des Rechts der Natur der Schul-lehrer ihre Doctrin, dass die durch das 
Recht der Natur verbothene Dinge per se & antecedenter ad voluntatem divinam böse wären/ mit 
beybehalten / auch nach ihrer Anleitung geschrieben, dass das Recht der Natur die Menschen 
verbinden würde / wenn gleich kein GOtt seyn oder sich umb die menschlichen Händel nicht 
bekümmern solte.’ Ibid., 76f.
31 Samuel Pufendorf, De iure naturae et gentium libri octo (Lund, 1672).
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was thus a common characteristic of all the anti-Pufendorfian works that they criticised sociality as
the ‘principium cognoscendi of the law of nature’ and sought to reassert the existence of a ‘lex 
aeterna’ and that certain things were good or bad in themselves prior to the divine will. In his 
Institutiones, Thomasius had criticised these doctrines, defended Pufendorf's magnum opus and 
asserted sociality as the principle of natural law, in particular against the attacks by the Leipzig 
theologian Valentin Alberti.32
Reitzer's Positionum is structured as introductory discussions of key concepts falling under 
the category ‘Right in general’ (Ius in genere). These include, the meaning of the terms ‘right’, 
‘law’, ‘command’ and ‘obligation’, and accordingly also the moral nature of man, moral status, and
other relevant issues. The work is clearly incomplete as Reitzer in several places referred to a 
second chapter which would discuss the principles of natural and universal positive divine law.33 
Nevertheless the often detailed discussions mean that Reitzer touched upon a wide range of issues 
to substantiate his definitions and their implications, drawing predominantly on the early chapters 
of Pufendorf's De iure and De officio hominis et civis iuxtam legem naturalem (On the Duty of 
Man and Citizen According to Natural Law),34 Thomasius's Institutes and Grotius's De iure belli ac
pacis. The work thus provides ample material to show that he, like Thomasius, followed the 
fundamentals of Pufendorf's position, and precisely those that were considered most controversial 
at the time: his moral voluntarism, the doctrine of entia physica and moralia and imposed statuses, 
and the injunction of sociality as the foundational precept of natural law.35
Reitzer signals his commitment to Pufendorf’s and Thomasius's advances in the theory of 
natural law by prefacing the Positionum with a brief account of the importance and development of
32 ‘Alle Scripta Anti-Pufendorffiana zielen dahin / dass die Socialität kein Principium cognoscendi des 
Rechts der Natur seyn könne. […] Hiernechst haben die meisten sich angelegen seyn lassen / die ex 
lege aeterna hergeleitete convenientiam cum sanctitate divina antecedenter ad voluntatem divinam, 
oder die sogenandte perseitatem turpitudinis & honestatis in objecta Juris naturae, die von dem Herrn 
von Pufendorff von ihrem Thron ware verstossen worden / wieder auff denselben zu heben.’ 
Thomasius, ‘Collegium privatum’, 79.
33 Reitzer, Positionum ex jure divino, pos. 1(c).
34 Samuel Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem libri duo (Lund, 1673).
35 For an analysis of these issues in Pufendorf, see Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, chapter 4, in particular 
pp. 162ff.
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the discipline similar to the one given by Thomasius.36 Among the greatest advances of the modern 
age was that the ‘discipline of universal divine law’ had been put on a firm foundation. Grotius was
the first properly to distinguish natural and positive law. On this basis, the ‘clouds’ with which the 
scholastic moralists had obscured Scripture were dispersed, the boundaries between (divine) 
natural law and divine positive law were defined and each thus put on a secure basis.37 However, 
this did not mean that Reitzer was primarily a ‘Grotian’, and in fact criticised Grotius along lines 
suggested by Pufendorf.
The first criticism of Grotius came early in the work, where Reitzer adopted Pufendorf's 
voluntarist and anti-scholastic definition of law as a command issuing from a superior. In a note to 
positio 5, Reitzer explained that this definition was in contrast to ‘what Grotius seems to establish 
with the scholastics, when in the Prolegomena to De iure belli ac pacis §11 he says that “the law of
nature would obligate even if God did not exist”.’38 In elaborating on this definition in the 
following positio, Reitzer further argued that since a law is the command of a superior, and since 
God has no superior, God cannot be subject to law. On this basis he criticised a doctrine held not 
only by Catholic scholastics, but also, as Reitzer undoubtedly knew, by many Protestant natural 
lawyers (including, as we shall see, Henrik Weghorst): ‘And from this follows that the “eternal 
law” according to which the scholastics say God acts is a pure figment of the imagination.’39 
Despite his praise of Grotius in the preface, then, Reitzer, like Pufendorf and Thomasius, saw his 
break with scholasticism as incomplete in crucial respects. Indeed, Reitzer also followed the 
implications of Pufendorf's voluntarism for his understanding of man's moral nature and the 
character and principles of natural law. Of these two central topics, the first received the most 
thorough discussion, as the discussion of the second belonged to a later part of the work.
Reitzer's discussion of moral status, in which he followed Pufendorf's distinction between 
physical and moral entities, came in positio 23 on how man can hold rights.40 ‘Rights belong to a 
36 For a discussion of the importance of such histories, see Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the 
Early Enlightenment, 66, 137.
37 Reitzer, Positionum ex jure divino, [first unnumbered page headed ‘L.S.’].
38 ‘Contra quam cum Scholasticis statuere videtur Grotius, dum in Prolegominis Jur. B. & P. §11. Legem
Naturalem obligaturam fore dicit, etiamsi daremus non esse Deum.’ Ibid., pos.5(a).
39 ‘Et hinc sequitur, aeternam illam legem, secundum quam agere Deum Scholastici dicunt (b), merum 
solummodo esse figmentum.’ Ibid., pos.6.
40 Reitzer here referred the reader to Pufendorf's De iure (bk. 1, ch. 1 and bk. 2, ch. 2), De officio (bk. 2, 
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person’, Reitzer explained, ‘not as a physical but as a moral person, and indeed as a man 
considered as existing in a certain status.’ A status, then, was a given man's ‘place and condition in 
communal life’, according to which a person hold certain rights and obligation granted to him by a 
superior.41 Reitzer emphasised two aspects of this definition of person and status. First, the 
complete separation between man's physical nature and moral personhood. Thus, a single natural 
person could ‘enjoy several statuses’, such as ‘father in the house, advisor in the court, senator in 
the senate, captain in the army etc.’, along with the different rights and obligations of each as long 
as they were compatible. Moreover, several natural persons could be considered as one ‘complex 
person’ if united in moral status, such as states, churches and universities. Second, although status 
was a moral quality superimposed on man, man was never in fact without a particular moral status 
of one sort or the other. For at the very least man was in a natural state or state of humanity, in 
which he enjoyed certain rights and obligations, itself a status imposed on man as a moral person – 
by God.42
Natural law, then, was the law God had imposed on man to govern his behaviour in the 
‘natural state’, bestowing on man certain rights and obligations.43 As mentioned, Reitzer did not 
discuss natural law as an independent subject of a positio, but his position is evident from places 
where natural law is touched upon in discussing other issues. Thus, in positio 32 Reitzer made it 
clear that sociality, by which the temporal happiness of mankind is maintained, was the foundation 
of natural law.44 From the fact that human nature was such that it could not be maintained without 
this law, one should conclude that God in fact obligated men to obey it: ‘By the very act by which 
ch. 1) and Thomasius's Institutiones (bk. 1, ch. 2).
41 ‘Jus autem (a) personae competit, non qua illa physice, sed qua moraliter (b) & quidem tamquam 
homo in statu aliquo (c) existens consideratur. Status enim est ipse cujusvis hominis in communi vitae 
locus & conditio’ Reitzer, Positionum ex jure divino, pos.23.
42 ‘... abstrahendo ab ista moralitate, nullum ipsi jus competit, ut ut inde non sequatur, dari hominem, qui
in nullo existat statu. Eo ipso enim, quo homo est, in statu quoq; humanitatis degit; at hic status 
propria sua etiam habet jura.’ Ibid., pos.23(b), cf. (dI). Cf. Pufendorf, De iure, bk. 1. ch. 2, §§7&12.
43 This was not just in a hypothetical state of nature, or the state of nature obtaining between states, but 
also the status man enjoyed in virtue of being human. on the various meanings of the term ‘status 
naturalis’, see Reitzer, Positionum ex jure divino, pos.23(dI–III).
44 ‘Cum enim socialitas, qua utique temporaria humani generis continetur felicitas, en eo consistat, ut 
sarta tectaque mortalibus talia sua sint jura, consequens est, haec in universum non magis, quam ipsas 
naturae leges, quae quidem conservandae socialitati[s] sunt latae, mutari tollique posse.’ Ibid., pos.32.
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God the Creator of all things imposed on us a certain nature, which cannot be preserved without 
observing the laws of nature, the observation of these laws is understood to be imperatively 
imposed on us.’45
In the Positionum ex jure divino universali, then, Reitzer was effectively in the process of 
constructing an introduction to Pufendorfian natural law. This included presenting precisely the 
aspects of this system which were most controversial at the time, the strict distinction between 
moral theology and natural law, the strong moral voluntarism and doctrine of imposed statuses or 
personae, and sociality as the foundation of natural law. The wider significance of this becomes 
clear, when we consider the religious and political aims of Pufendorf's works on natural law. As 
Ian Hunter has argued, Pufendorf had developed a ‘detranscendentalised’ theory of natural law to 
promote the ‘secularisation’ of the early modern state. In doing so Pufendorf had reformed the 
discipline of natural law that had held together a philosophical-theological synthesis that was 
centred in the faculties of theology and helped secure the influence of theologians in the political-
religious constitution of the early modern confessional state. Pufendorf's works on natural law thus 
had important consequences for the nature of the state and were part of a contest between two 
professional groups about the authority to determine the social and political order of the state, the 
theologians or the jurists.46 In adopting the more radical aspects of Pufendorf's theory of natural 
law, Reitzer was simultaneously championing this political programme.
5. Christian natural law: Weghorst's Compendii iuris naturae dissertatio prima
At first glance, Weghorst's Compendii iuris naturae dissertatio prima might give the impression 
that Weghorst was indeed following Grotius or Pufendorf in his theory of natural law. The work 
begins with a substantial quotation from Grotius's De iure belli ac pacis defining ius naturae, and 
contains further quotations from Grotius in key places. Likewise, the structure of the work bears 
some resemblance to Pufendorf's De officio hominis et civis, the first chapter concerning the 
definition of natural law, followed by chapters on the principles of natural law and on the duties 
towards God. This structure of discussing duties towards oneself, God, and other persons was, 
45 ‘Eo ipso ergo, quo Deus rerum omnium Creator naturam nobis indidit, quae sine observatione legum 
naturalium salva esse nequit, earum etiam observationem pro imperio nobis injunxisse intelligitur.’ 
Ibid., pos.33(f).
46 Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, 150, 162f, 195; Haakonssen, ‘German Natural Law’, 261f.
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however, quite conventional in the Lutheran world.47 Moreover and more significantly, a closer 
look at Weghorst's argumentation quickly reveals that his position departed significantly from both 
Grotius and Pufendorf. In fact, as will be shown, Weghorst's Compendium exhibited all the 
characteristics of ‘anti-Pufendorfian’ works of natural law identified by Thomasius, and this 
reflected the academic environment in which Weghorst had received his university training.
Weghorst had received his university education at Kiel University in the Duchies of 
Schleswig-Holstein, where he enrolled in 1670. After some years, he did the usual European tour, 
to Germany, Italy and France, before before returning to Kiel where he became Dr. Jur. in 1681. 
Natural law had been taught at Kiel University since it was founded in 1665. During Weghorst’s 
studies there, the professor of natural law was Samuel Rachel, a prominent representative of what 
has been termed ‘Christian natural law’.48 This tradition, which also included authors such as 
Johann von Felde, Caspar Ziegler, Johann Adam Osiander, and Valentin Alberti, sought to re-
establish natural law on a Christian foundation against the secularising theories of natural law 
developed by Grotius and Hobbes, and later Pufendorf and Thomasius. Rachel was one of the 
thinkers, also including Pufendorf and Conring, whom Baron von Boineburg approached to 
produce a system of natural law.49 Weghorst had ample opportunity to become acquainted with the 
tradition of ‘Christian natural law’: according to the Catalogus lectionum in Academia Christian-
Albertina Kiliensi, Rachel taught courses on ‘Jus naturale’ in 1671, on ‘Jura naturae & arbitraria’ in
1672, on Grotius's De iure belli ac pacis in 1673, ‘Juris naturae & gentium doctrina’ in 1674, his 
Dissertationes de Jure naturae in 1675, and ‘Jurisprudentia universalis’ in 1676-7.50
47 Found, for instance, in Samuel Rachel and H. G. Masius.
48 See Hans-Peter Schneider, ‘Christliches Naturrecht’, in Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts, ed. 
Helmut Holzhey and Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, vol. 4: Das Heilige Römische Reich Deutscher 
Nation, Nord- und Ostmitteleuropa, Zweiter Halbband (Basel, 2001), 813–35; Schneider, Justitia 
universalis, for Rachel pp. 208–223; Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, 132–4. Rachel's 1676 De jure 
naturae et gentium dissertationes was included in the Carnegie series on international law as an 
important alternative to Pufendorf's doctrine of the law of nations, Samuel Rachel, De Jure Naturae et 
Gentium Dissertationes (1776), ed. Carl Ludwig Bar, trans. John Pawley Bate, 2 vols, Classics of 
international law (Washington, 1916).
49 Rachel, Dissertationes, I§101; Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment, 47.
50 Catalogus lectionum in Academia Kiliensi, Personal- und Vorlesungsverzeichnis der Christian-
Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, n.d., 
http://www.uni-kiel.de/journals/receive/jportal_jpjournal_00000001.
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In the construction of his natural law theory, Rachel discussed several ‘modern’ works, but 
in particular Hugo Grotius's De iure belli ac pacis which he interpreted through William Grotius's 
De principiis iuris naturalis. Rachel drew extensively on certain scholastic doctrines combined 
with extensive use of Aristotle and Cicero, as was common to much Protestant natural law 
theorising in the wake of Grotius. Central to Rachel's theory was the view that certain things or 
actions were eternally and in themselves good and provided a fundamental framework for God's 
creation. Natural law was the means by which man was obligated to do those things good in 
themselves and avoid those bad in themselves: ‘and hence it is that that which the Law of Nature 
enjoins or forbids is not, respectively, good or bad merely because God has of his free will decided 
to enjoin the one or forbid he other; but since the former is in its essence wholly good and the latter
wholly bad, God could not but forbid this and enjoin that.’51
In further determining the specific precepts of natural law, Rachel turned first to discuss the
alternative ‘systems’ for determining these laws. Having presented contemporary theories, 
including those of Selden, Sharrock, Cherbury, Cumberland and Hobbes, he finally turned to 
Aristotle's Posterior Analytics for a method for the discipline of natural law or ‘scientia 
philosophiae moralis’.52 Having set down as first principles the existence of God, divine providence
and the immortality of the soul, Rachel on this basis developed the laws of nature governing man's 
society with God and with other humans.
In order to determine these, Rachel argued, one must first ask ‘What is the ultimate end of 
man considered as a political animal by nature, ζῶον φύσει πολιτικόν? That end, I say, is 
conformity or congruence of the human will, which is the proximate principle of moral conduct, 
with the Divine will, as expressed in natural laws.’53 In so doing man would not only express the 
51 ‘Hujus igitur Legis Aeternae radii sunt Leges Naturales, quas nobis Ratio, divinae particula aurae, 
indicat, persuadet ac promulgat. Atque hinc est, quod quidquid Jure Naturae, vel praecipitur vel 
vetatur, illud non bonum nec malum est ideo quod Deus illud libere voluit praecipere, hoc vetare; sed 
quia intrinsecus illud omne bonum, & hoc omne malum est, Deus illud non potuit non praecipere, hoc 
vetare. Ut ita simul intelliges, quo pacto hoc jus divinum Naturale, a Jure divino arbitratio differat. 
Grot I.c.1.n.10 & 15; Wilh.Grot.de.princ.cap.3.n.2.’ Rachel, Dissertationes, I:§32.
52 Ibid., I§114.
53 ‘Discipiendum itaque primo omnium erit, quis sit Hominis finis ultimus, quatenus ille ut ζῶον φύσει 
πολιτικόν, animal natura civile, consideratur. Hunc finem esse dico, conformitatem seu convenientiam 
voluntatis humanae, quae actionum moralium proximum est principium, cum voluntate divina legibus 
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‘primeval image of God’ but also, Rachel asserted with a reference to William Grotius, ‘attain the 
utmost perfection of which he is capable in this life.’54 In elucidating what this meant in more 
specific terms, Rachel resorted to the Roman law dictum ‘suum cuique tribuere’: ‘Man, therefore, 
attains this Assimilation and Perfection when he renders to God, to himself, and to his fellows the 
things which are due to them respectively, and avoids the contrary.’55 Finally, in answering the 
question of what the due – the ‘praestanda’ – according to natural law amounted to, Rachel found 
no better answer than piety to God and the Aristotelian virtues to others in human society.56
Although Weghorst never cites Rachel in his Collegium iuris naturae, there are, as will be 
shown, several points of similarity on central issues in their theories of natural law. Weghorst thus 
drew on several Grotius-commentators from the seventeenth century that had endeavoured to 
‘Christianise’ Grotius's theory of natural law, Caspar Ziegler, Philipp Reinhart Vitriarius and 
William Grotius, as well as the French jurist Jean Domat, to develop his own theory of natural law.
Weghorst was, moreover, undoubtedly aware of Pufendorf's position, as the citations in the work 
reveal. At one point Weghorst cited Pufendorf's De officio, on the issue of innate ideas, only to 
dismiss discussion of the issue as redundant (‘supervacuum’).57 Another paragraph cites a section 
of Vitriarius's commentary on Grotius, which refers the reader to a part of Pufendorf's Specimen 
controversarium circa ius naturale, ‘De origine moralitatis et indifferentia motus physici in actione
humana’, that discusses the distinction between entia physica and moralia.58 It would thus seem 
that Weghorst was consciously developing an alternative to Pufendorf's theory of natural law 
naturalibus expressa.’ Ibid., I§117.
54 ‘in quo fine ultimo cum Homo maximam, cujus quidem in hac vita particeps esse queat, consequatur 
perfectionem’  Ibid.
55 ‘Hanc ὁμοίωσιν & τελείωσιν Homo itaq; obtinet, si Deo, sibi, & aliis praestanda praestet, vitetq; 
contraria.’ Ibid., I§118.
56 Ibid., I§121. Rachel also equated piety with religion and the ‘duties of the first table of the Decalogue’.
Ibid., I§115.
57 Weghorst, Compendii, cap.1§16. Weghorst here also paraphrased the same passage in Aristotle's 
Topica (without reference) that Rachel had used in justifying the existence of first principles that 
should not be questioned: ‘Recte Aristoteles, eum, qui Deum honorandum aut parentes amandos esse 
neget, non argumentis sed poena domandum dixit.’ Cf. Rachel, Dissertationes, I§115.
58 Weghorst, Compendii, cap.1§8. Referring to Philippus Reinhardus Vitriarius, Institutiones juris 
naturae et gentium [...] ad methodum Hugonis Grotii conscriptae (Lugduni Batavorum, 1692), chapter
1, question 12.
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which was becoming increasingly in vogue, and which was spearheaded in Copenhagen by his 
colleague Reitzer.
Grotius's theory of natural law in De iure belli fitted Weghorst's purposes in that it allowed 
him to argue that certain things were necessarily in accordance with ‘rational nature’ as an 
objective basis of natural law. In other words, he could use Grotius as an authority for the 
‘perseitas’ or the inherentness of virtue and vice as the object of natural law: ‘Therefore according 
to the opinion of Grotius there are actions necessarily conforming or contrary to rational nature, 
and which by their nature are prior to natural law’.59 This was a ‘necessity’ of the ‘moral action’ 
which was independent of the determination of any law, but which rather showed which actions the
law should determine as obligatory and thus invest with a ‘legal necessity’.60 Weghorst thus 
insisted, contrary to the Pufendorfian position, that certain moral actions, ‘worshipping God’ is the 
example given, are ‘necessary in themselves apart from the obligation of law.’61 As he concluded 
later in the same chapter: ‘thus actions morally good in themselves are the foundation of natural 
law.’62 In this regard, Weghorst positioned himself in a line of natural law theoreticians, such as 
Osiander, Ziegler and Vitriarius, who criticised Grotius's etiamsi daremus-principle by arguing that
the obligatory force of natural law stemmed from the command of God, but likewise, in contrast to 
Pufendorf, argued that certain actions were good in themselves and therefore the object of natural 
law.
The further question, however, was in what this ‘necessary conformity’ with rational nature
consisted, in other words, what was the ‘principium cognoscendi’ of natural law. Here Weghorst's 
theory of natural law exhibited a second of the scholastic, anti-Pufendorfian characteristics 
identified by Thomasius, explicitly departing from the position of Grotius (and Pufendorf) in 
denying that sociality (such ‘actions that conserve the society of rational beings’) was a sufficient 
basis for natural law:
59 ‘Ergo secundum sententiam Grotii dantur actus naturae rationali necessario convenientes aut 
disconvenientes, qui sui natura jus naturae antecedunt’ Weghorst, Compendii, cap.1§4.
60 Ibid., cap.1.§5.
61 ‘Ita cultus Dei, etiam seposita obligatione legis, in se necessarius, & recta ratio eum homini necessario 
convenientem judicat’ Ibid., cap.1§6. 
62 ‘Fundamentum itaque juris naturae, sunt actus hominum in se moraliter boni & male’ Ibid., cap.1§13.
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As I see it, it is indubitable that those actions without which or by which society among 
humans is destroyed pertain to natural law. But that all the precepts of natural law have as their 
end that human society is maintained,  I believe should be rejected. No indeed, from the 
following it will be clear that those precepts which seem to have as their end the maintenance 
of society do not have this as their final end.63
Where Grotius had secularised natural law by positing sociality as a necessary and sufficient 
foundation and by his etiamsi daremus-principle, and where Pufendorf had detranscendentalised 
natural law with his radical voluntarism, Weghorst reinforced the transcendent character of natural 
law and moved God centre stage by positing the love of God as the foundation of natural law:
Disregarding the opinions of others, I consider that man is created first and foremost for this 
end: that he should love God. And since the love of God is good in itself, God also obliges man
to do so by the natural law. From this it is evident that the basis of natural law should be 
determined in accordance with the end of man, so that accordingly the basis of natural law is 
the love of God, of oneself, and one's fellow man. Of these the love of God is the foremost end.
[…] Neither indeed do they err, who posit the basis of natural law solely in the love of God, for
from this cannot but follow the love of men.64
This paragraph succinctly demonstrates the extent to which Weghorst's position was in line with 
the key doctrines of ‘anti-Pufendorfian’, neo-scholastic, Christian natural law identified by 
Thomasius. First, in the quote Weghorst emphasised the realist character of his theory of natural 
law, that this love of God was ‘good in itself’ and therefore obligatory, not the other way around. 
Second, Weghorst's natural law theory was indeed orientated towards the essential nature of man, 
63 ‘Mihi equidem indubitatum est, actus ejusmodi sine quibus, aut per quos societas inter homines 
evertitur, ad jus naturae pertinere; at omnia juris naturalis praecepta ad hunc finem referri, ut societas 
inter homines salva sit, negandum esse arbitror. Im[m]o ex sequentibus patebit, praecepta illa, quae 
societatem tanquam finem suum tueri videntur, in eo tanquam fine ultimo non subsistere.’ Ibid., 
cap.1.§9.
64 ‘Missis aliorum opinionibus existimamus, hominem primario ob hunc finem esse factum, ut diligat 
Deum. Cum autem dilectio Dei in se sit bona, Deus quoque hominem per jus naturae ad eam obligat. 
Unde apparet fundamentum juris naturae a fine hominis aestimandum, ut ita fundamentum juris 
naturae sit, dilectio Dei, sui ipsius, & socii. Ex his dilectio Dei, principalis est finis. [...] Neque vero 
errant, qui fundamentum juris naturae in sola Dei dilectione ponunt, quippe cum hanc non possit non 
sequi dilectio hominis.’ Ibid., cap.1§10.
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realising the end – finis – for which man has been created. Finally, to Weghorst sociality was not 
the fundamental principle as it could, he argued, encompass neither man's duties to himself nor to 
God.65
Having appropriated Grotius's use of the perseitas-doctrine only to argue for an alternative 
foundation of natural law to sociality, Weghorst continued to further distinguish his position from 
the aspects of Grotius's position that tended towards a secularised conception of natural law. 
Against Grotius's argument that natural law would oblige if there was no God, he put forward a 
voluntarist concept of obligation. Following Caspar Ziegler, he argued that it was God as a 
supreme legislator that promulgated the law of nature and invested it with obligatory force.66 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, God did so in accordance with the essential goodness of certain 
actions. In this way Weghorst adopted, again following Ziegler, the scholastic doctrine of an 
‘eternal law’ in accordance with which God acted: ‘moreover, we do not deny that the principle of 
this law [of nature] is the law in God, by which He Himself directs all acts and movements to their 
ends. See Ziegler on Grotius's Prolegomena, section “Non esse Deum etc.”.’67
In determining the specific precepts of natural law Weghorst (like Rachel) first discussed 
the principles commonly advanced: the three established Roman law principles in Ulpian: ‘honeste 
vivere’, ‘neminem laedere’, and ‘suum cuique tribuere’.68 In his interpretation of the Roman law 
principles, Weghorst drew on Aristotelian virtue ethics: ‘of these principles we consider the 
foremost of all to be that we live honourably [honeste vivere]. For to live honourably is to practice 
any duty of love, be it towards God or man […] and in this [principle] the precepts of all the virtues
are contained.’69 In the end, however, he settled on a different set of principles more in accordance 
65 Ibid., cap.1.§12.
66 Ibid., cap.1§14. 
67 ‘Alioqui non negamus principium hujus juris esse legem in DEO, per quam ipse omnes actus ac motus
in suos fines dirigit. Add. Ziegl. ad Grot. in proleg. Vers: Non esse Deum &c.’ Ibid., cap.1§15. Ziegler 
has the following: ‘Interim tamen hoc non nego esse en Deo aeternam aliquam legem, hoc est rationem
divinae sapientiae, directivam omnium actionum & motuum in suos fines, & jus aliquod naturale 
immanens antecedenter ad omnem liberum voluntatis actum, secuncum quod non potest velle juri illi 
repugnat.’ Kaspar Ziegler, In Hugonis Grotii De Iure Belli Ac Pacis Libros, Quibus Naturae & 
Gentium Ius Explicavit, Notae & Animadversiones Subitariae (Wittebergae, 1666), 7f.
68 Weghorst, Compendii, cap.2§1.
69 ‘Ex his primum omnium principium existimamus esse, honeste vivere. Est enim honeste vivere, 
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with the theory of the love of God as the foundation of natural law that he had developed in the 
previous chapter: ‘(1) love in the proper way. (2) love God from your heart. (3) love your fellow 
man as yourself.’ The love of God, moreover, could be considered specifically as what was His due
and generally as doing everything which God has commanded, including the totality of one's duties
according to natural law.70
The final chapter discussed the duties specifically towards God: the right knowledge, or 
contemplation, of God and the worship (cultus) of God which Weghorst comprehended under the 
concept of piety (pietas). Although Weghorst concluded the work with the remark that he had 
shown the knowledge philosophy could obtain although divorced from Christian faith, his position 
in this regard was ambiguous. For Weghorst also warned that although it was not the place to 
explain how God should be contemplated ‘according to divine revelation’, in fact it was ‘not within
our powers to comprehend God by means of reason’.71 Therefore, one should beware not to be led 
astray by reason, and ‘the knowledge of God should be sought in such a way that reason is 
contained within the bounds of worship, veneration and fear.’72 
Weghorst's Compendium on natural law was an independent work although it shares a 
number of characteristics with the kind of natural law Samuel Rachel had taught (without referring 
to him). Weghorst followed Grotius precisely on those issues where the latter had retained 
scholastic doctrines also found in Rachel: the notion of the perseitas of good and evil and an 
eternal law in accordance with which God obligated man through natural law. Moreover, where 
Weghorst was the most original in relation to his intellectual background, positing the love of God 
rather than sociality as the foundation of the law of nature, this had the effect of emphasising the 
Christian and transcendent aspects of his theory of natural law even further.
quodvis amoris officium exercere; sive illud exhibendum sit Deo, sive homini […] Unde hoc principio
omnia virtutum praecepta continentur.’ Ibid., cap.2§2. 
70 Ibid., cap.2§6–7; and cf. Rachel above at note 58.
71 Ibid., cap.3§7.
72 ‘Cum nostrorum virium non sit, DEum ratione assequi, cavendum esse, ne proprius accedamus ad 
lucem illam inacessim, ne radiorum fulgore obruamur. Ita enim cognitio Dei appetenda, ut intra cultus,
venerationis & timoris concellos ratio contineatur.’ Ibid., cap.3§7.
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6. Perspectives into the eighteenth century
Seen against the background of the official theological divine right ideology in Denmark-Norway 
and Masius's explicit rejection of the discipline of natural law divorced from revelation, both 
Weghorst and Reitzer may be said to have broken new ground.73 However, as has been shown, they
did so in very different ways that indicate the range of discourses on natural law in the early Danish
enlightenment. By drawing on and presenting the anti-scholastic natural law theories of Pufendorf 
and Thomasius, Reitzer's Positionum constituted a fundamental criticism of the intellectual 
underpinnings of the confessional state most radically represented by Masius in Denmark-Norway. 
Weghorst, for his part, developed a theory of natural law that, while not as extreme as Masius, 
criticised the secularising tendencies in Grotius and Pufendorf and reiterated many of the central 
doctrines of scholastic natural law.
In the first place Weghorst's more conservative ‘Christian natural law’, and thus the legacy 
from Kiel, won out over Reitzer's attempts to introduce the Halle school of natural law into the 
university of Copenhagen. It was Weghorst and not Reitzer who taught natural law and moral 
philosophy at the University in the first decades of the eighteenth century. Where, according to the 
lecture catalogue, Reitzer focused on Danish law, Weghorst lectured on Grotius's De iure belli ac 
pacis 1710-17 and on moral philosophy from 1710 to his death in 1722.74 Weghorst continued to 
develop his theory of natural law to underpin a moral philosophy in opposition to the Pufendorfian 
position. Like his Compendium from the 1690s his later works argued for the existence of a bonum
morale independent of law, in particular the love of God for which man was first and foremost 
created, combining this with an Aristotelian catalogue of virtues.75 This competition between 
Reitzer's and Weghorst's theories of natural law and political theories also found echoes in 
university disputations. A 1709 university dissertation contrasted the notion that the state was 
created for the sake of utility, which the author attributed to Pufendorf, with a definition of the 
state, which Weghorst had ‘given in a public lecture’, as a natural society aiming at the ‘bonum 
commune’ over and above civil utility.76
73 For a succinct account of Maius's place in official royal ideology, see Olden-Jørgensen, ‘Scandinavia’, 
324–6.
74 Lectiones publicae Professorum in Universitate Hauniensi.
75 Henrik Weghorst, Labyrinthus moralis, juri naturali pervius, cujus duas partes cum adjecto virtutum 
hortulo (Hafniae, 1713), the second part of which is entitled ‘de bono morali ante legem’.
76 Christian Ramus, Dissertatio historico-politica prima, de prima civitatum origine earumqve 
21
Weghorst's moral philosophy and theory of natural law were, however, not completely 
hegemonic in the intellectual life of the Danish-Norwegian capital. It is well known that Reitzer, 
whose extensive library provided a focal point for a large and diverse circle of enlightenment 
thinkers,77 encouraged Ludvig Holberg to write his Danish introduction to natural law. The work, 
published in 1716, followed Pufendorf's theory of natural law to a large extent and became very 
popular, going through several editions in the eighteenth century. The findings presented in this 
article should, however, serve to caution against too readily assuming that this work was 
representative of the political ideology of the time, and highlight the need to ask precisely what 
kind of Pufendorfian natural law was developed and what its precise position in the Danish-
Norwegian context was.78 Thus it has been pointed out that Holberg passed over Pufendorf's 
doctrine of the distinction between entia physica and moralia in silence.79 A reason for this may 
have been that this doctrine was closely connected to Pufendorf's criticism of a ‘bonum morale ante
legem’, the position which, as we have seen, Weghorst was championing in those years.
That this arose perhaps not entirely from strategic considerations on Holberg's part is 
brought out in a controversy over the marriage between close relatives that broke out a few years 
later; a controversy which also showed some of the wider religious-political issues at stake in the 
competition between different forms of natural law. The controversy surrounded a dissertation that 
the young Andreas Hojer (1690-1739) from Schleswig had written while in Helmstedt and 
published in Lemgow, Germany in 1718.80 Hojer had studied under Christian Thomasius in 1707-9 
and drew on Thomasius's theory of natural law to argue that marriage between closely related was 
constitutione (Hafniae, 1709), fol. A3v.
77 For an account of this circle, see Martin Mulsow, ‘Freethinking in Early Eighteenth-Century Protestant
Germany: Peter Friedrich Arpe and the “Traité Des Trois Imposteurs”’, in Heterodoxy, Spinozism, and
Free Thought in Early Eighteenth Century Europe, ed. Silvia Berti, Françoise Charles-Daubert, and 
Richard Popkin (Dordrecht, 1996), 204–8.
78 For this question, see Haakonssen, ‘Holbergs Pufendorf – men hvilken Pufendorf?’. For an answer, see
Knud Haakonssen, ‘The Law of Nature and Nations’, in Ludvig Holberg (1684-1754). Learning and 
Literature in the Nordic Enlightenment, ed. Knud Haakonssen (forthcoming 2016), 2–24. I am grateful
to Knud Haakonssen for allowing me to read, and cite, this manuscript.
79 Haakonssen, ‘The Law of Nature and Nations’, 3, 9f.
80 Andreas Hojer, De nuptiis propinquorum iure divino non prohibitis (n.p, n.d.). For an account of the 
work and the controversy with Holberg in particular, see Haakonssen, ‘The Law of Nature and 
Nations’, 15–17; Troels G. Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist og historiker (København, 1961), 40–54. 
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not prohibited by natural law in a strict sense nor by positive divine law (although it was contrary 
to Christian perfection), and was only prohibited by the positive laws of the sovereign in the 
interest of social order.81 Hojer, a longtime rival of Holberg, returned to Copenhagen to pursue a 
career there, and the pamphlet was brought to the attention to some of the professors of theology. 
Hojer was summoned for interrogation by the professors, and Holberg wrote a pamphlet under 
pseudonym criticising Hojer's arguments.
The difference between Holberg's and Hojer's positions, both considered proponents of 
Pufendorfian and Thomasian natural law, is illustrative of the different ways this form of natural 
law was appropriated and used. Holberg first of all declared that he would leave the issue of divine 
positive law to the judgement of the theologians, the proper authorities on the subject.82 With 
regard to his arguments concerning the natural legal prohibition, his position has been characterised
as partly ‘a turn towards a substantial 'naturalism' that is a complete lapse from his Pufendorfian 
principles […] Holberg used 'nature' and 'the natural' as normative concepts in themselves’.83 In 
other words, Holberg was here much closer to Weghorst's position that certain things were morally 
bad per se, ‘ante legem’. During the investigation by the theologians and the letters he sent to the 
king in his defence, Hojer, on his part, maintained his position that such marriage was not 
prohibited by natural law strictly speaking ‘in so far as it derives from socialitas’, arguing further 
that such issues were discussed freely in Germany and, moreover, that the theologians for the most 
part lacked the requisite knowledge to understand the issue. Instead he asked that the opinions of 
the professors of law, which included Reitzer, as well as Christian Heinrich Amthor, another 
follower of Christian Thomasius, former professor of natural law in Kiel and now Royal Historian 
in Copenhagen,  be requested as the proper authorities on natural law.84 
81 Hojer, De nuptiis propinquorum, 84f.
82 Ludvig Holberg, Dissertatio juridica de nuptiis propinquorum in linea recta jure naturali prohibitis 
(Rostock, 1719), 2.
83 Haakonssen, ‘The Law of Nature and Nations’, 16f.
84 The report of the theological faculty of the interrogation as well as Hojer's letters, are printed in Holger
Rørdam, Historiske Samlinger, vol. 2 (Kjøbenhavn, 1896), 319–359, pp. 332 and 336f. for Hojer's 
requests that the King seek the opinions of lawyers and Amthor as the proper authority on natural law. 
For Amthor, see the entry in Heiner F. Klemme and Manfred Kuehn, eds., The Bloomsbury Dictionary
of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers (New York, 2004).
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According to Hojer's letters, both Amthor's and Reitzer's opinions were favourable to 
Hojer's case,85 and not only were no further measures taken against him, he was employed in a 
string of public positions throughout the 1720s. Perhaps the ultimate vindication of Hojer came 
with his appointment to the new professorship in the law of nature and of nations in 1734. Here, in 
a public disputation later published in Latin as well as a Danish translation, Hojer warned his 
young students against the doctrines ‘that actions are good or bad independently of divine will, and
that the just and the morally good are the same and would obligate even if God did not exist.’86 
This did not mean, however, that Pufendorfian-Thomasian natural law had finally attained 
hegemony. For now, the opponents defending these doctrines were Christian Wolff and his 
disciples.
7. Conclusion
Existing scholarship has described the history of natural law in early enlightenment Denmark-
Norway as the story of the introduction of ‘modern’ natural law derived from Grotius and 
Pufendorf in the generation around 1700. In contrast, this article has argued that the decades 
around 1700 in fact saw the rivalry and competition between significantly different traditions 
within post-Grotian natural law. Moreover, in so far as the Danish writers on natural law were 
following either Grotius or Pufendorf, they had been received and reinterpreted through local 
discourses of natural law: Rachel's ‘Christian natural law’ in Kiel in the case of Weghorst, and 
Thomasius's Pufendorfian natural law in Halle in the case of Reitzer. That these theories entailed 
far-reaching consequences for the understanding of religious, social and political matters, and who 
had the authority to determine these, has only briefly been hinted at in discussing the controversy 
surrounding the young Andreas Hojer.
The findings of this article suggest that rather than a successive series of periodisations, 
such as confessional divine right theory, over ‘modern’ natural law, to Montesquieuian political 
85 In his account of the affair, Hojer wrote: ‘Die Juristen haben zwar positiver [than the theologians] und 
jeder nach seinem Begriff geurtheilet, doch hoffe ich nicht, dasz einer von ihnen meine Sätze werde 
vor strafbahr oder verdammlich gehalten haben, da ich vielmehr weisz, dasz die Justitz Rähte Reitzer 
und Amthor mit meiner Schrift gar friedlich gewesen.’ Rørdam, Historiske Samlinger, II, 351.
86 ‘dogmata de actionibus antecedenter ad voluntatem divinam bonis aut malis. Nec non de Justo atque 
honesto, etiam si Deus non esset, tamen obligante, & eodem’, Andreas Hojer, Ideae Iurisconsulti 
Danici partem 1 disputatione anniversaria expositam (Hafniae, 1736), 25.
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theory, the intellectual and political history of early enlightenment Denmark-Norway is best told as
the history of authors, teachers and political actors using, adapting and developing a wide variety 
of political discourses for a variety of purposes. The reception of Pufendorf's and Thomasius's 
theories of natural law and their wider intellectual and political consequences, as well as other 
forms of natural law theory, largely remains to be told. By showing the diversity of natural law 
theorising as early as the 1690s, the present article has sought to open this as an area of further 
research.
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